Russia. 1 Unfortunately while hardly the first or most notorious manifestation of anti-Semitism in Russia, the January incident has been noted as perhaps emblematic of the increase in xenophobic sentiments in a country in which there is "more anti-Semitism than there are Jews."2
With the escalation of terrorist violence in Russia since the collapse of the USSR, relations among sub-national communal groups have come under increasing strain. The Putin administration thus finds itself confronted with a set of problems having a different character, in many important respects, from the set of problems faced by President Boris Yeltsin in the immediate wake of the collapse of the Soviet regime. These problems in all likelihood do not portend the eminent demise of the Russian Federation as a territorially discrete political entity. They are nonetheless shaping the character of the political system as it finds itself inevitably compelled to address them and probe for resolution. This essay explores the nature of the increasingly strained relations among major sub-national communal groups (particularly the Orthodox-identifying and Islamic-identifying communities), the factors apparently responsible, and most importantly considers the political responses evoked by the Putin administration towara their management and possible resolution. I begin by considering the rise in terrorist violence in Russia since the collapse of the USSR as a backdrop for exploring the complex relationsliip of the Putin regime with major communal groups, particularly religiously-based ones.
The incidence of terrorist violence in Russia has generally increased since the early-to-mid 1990s. Table 1 Further, since 2004, Russia has experienced not only a continuation of terrorist incidents, but also a spreading of the conflict in Chechnya to surrounding areas in tlie Caucasus mountain region.4 Over 400 people were killed in Russia by terrorist acts in 2004 alone, with 40 killed in a Moscow subway in February, more-or-less simultaneous sabotage-attacks on aircraft that killed 89 people on 24 August, and worst of all, die Beslan school horror in September that killed over 300 people, many of whom were children. Additionally, nearly 90 people were killed in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkaria in October 2005. Thus, numerous questions present themselves as not only germane but critical for understanding the nature of the Russian political regime that has emerged under President Vladimir Putin. How has the "reassertion of vertical autliority" affected relations among communal groups, especially religiously-based groups? Has the centralization of power had^the effect of reducing or exacerbating tensions among those groups? What is the relationship of the increasing centralization of power and the citizens' involvement in public affairs? And finally, what has been tlie disposition of the Putin regime toward the two major religiously-oriented communal groups: the Orthodox majority and tlie approximately 20 million Muslim community in Russia?
The last question had become increasingly important during Putin's second term of office, with the Kremlin's official view that mucli of tlie political resistance and militarized separatist activity in the Caucasus region is very much connected to international Islamist terrorist groups, particularly Al-Qaeda. Autumn 2004 witnessed a new stage in the determination of the Putin administration to further centralize authority, and to do so in the name of protecting, but not obUterating, civil society from the scourge of terrorism.'' This intensified centralization of power had significant ramifications for church-state relations, as we shall see below. On 16 February 2004, President Putin issued a decree establishing the National Counterterrorism Committee (NAK), after which the Duma passed a bill expanding the powers of the Russian state to counter terrorism; both of these had followed a call by Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov for an international front to combat terrorism.8 Further, during 2005, and evidently in response to the perception that foreign NGOs played a substantial and significant role in the "color revolutions" of Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004-05), and Kiygystan (2005), the Duma passed legislation designed to control more closely foreign organizations working in Russia. Since many of these NGOs presented themselves as working in the area of minority rights protection, a constriction of their activity is certain to affect the political climate in Russia; their exclusion altogether, of course, would do so even more. Some have viewed these centralization maneuvers as part of a larger plan conceived well before the dramatic increase in terrorist violence of [2003] [2004] : Peter Baker and Susan Glasser's Kremlin Rising, for example, dubbed this "Project Putin"; Allen Lynch in How Russia is Not Ruled (2005) , calls this transition from the chaos of the Yeltsin years the "GonsoHdation of Russia's Neopatrimonial System" (p. 159), and warns against confusing it with a "stabilization" of the political system. I am inclined to concur with Lynch on this point, and seek to demonstrate below that, regarding relations among communal groups, the increasing centralization of power may be working at cross- ecumenism is more characteristic. i4
In the more specifically political sphere, Nikolas Gvosdev has argued that there existed an important connection between the postSoviet Russian regime of "managed pluralism" and the critical role of religion, particularly Russian Orthodoxy, in Russia's identity, at least through tne first term ofthe Putin administration, is In Putin's second term, this "management" of Russia's ostensible pluralism has become increasingly dirigiste, and rather than abating, shows increasing signs of intensifying.
While creating a questionable appearance of stability, this dirigisime has raised numerous questions of crucial political importance. Can the ecumenical hegemonism work in the long run in such a deeply divided country? How does this general political trend fit in with the fact that Russia is not only muld-ethnic, but also tnultireligious? In what manner has the Orthodox Church operated with, ana reacted to, Putin's regime? And how have popular attitudes among Russians changed, if at all, towards non-Russian ethnic minorities, and toward religious minorities, particularly Muslims? The resolution of such questions have already begun shaping the nature of the Russian political system, and perhaps have done so most powerfully by raising again in bold relief the age-old question of Russian identity, and to that we now tum.
The perennially problematical question of Russia's identity has resurfaced in the early twenty-first century in an especially otninous form regarding religious tolerance and civility among comtnunal groups. Perhaps symptotnatically, the Duma considered a bill in 2006, to define Russian national identity. The imtnediate effect of the bill, however, exacerbated tensions with society, and particularly between This may all be true, but to the extent that such a monoculturalism might be emerging, it is proving to be deeply problematical across numerous axes of conflict given the events of trie past several years.
Numerous questions immediately arise; what role has Russian Orthodoxy played in this process, both as an institution and as a cultural and intellectual force within the Russian Federation? Is it possible to manage Russia's highly multinational and religiously heterogeneous character without descending any further into authoritarianism? And perhaps most vexing, what role do the major religious institutions and ideas in Russia play in making the difficult but inevitable decisions attempting to establish a balance between citizens' rights and fending off credible, bona fide threats to the common good from religious and political extremists? In this respect, it was certainly understandable that President Putin would find it appropriate to begin massing the political power of the state to enable tne governance of Russia; after all, even Westem observers had noted that one of the key problems of the Yeltsin administration was not that the Russian state was too strong, but rather that it was not strong enough to effectively govem.2i
The complex nexus of religious identity, national identity, social values, and practical problems of governance can be seen to converge in Russia under Putin in the revesting but deeply controversial matter of religious content of school curricula, and specifically the fate of the Russian Orthodox Church's proposal for mandatory courses on "Basics of Orthodox Culture."22 As of late 2006, this matter had generated such sharp disputes between the church and the Ministry of Education and Science that the matter was remanded to the Public Chamber in late November (this 127-member appointed body was established by the Putin administration in 2005 toTielp build civil society in Russia). The Public Chamber adopted a compromise position, but one that generally favored the position of the Russian Ortnodox Church.23 Interestingly, the church also announced support for secondary school courses on regarding Russian territorial integrity have strengthened the long-standing Russian tradition of a strong and centralized state. A degree of recentralization and reassertion of Russian nationalism and culture at the expense of minorities were to be expected following the chaos of the early post-Soviet years. But the tum the Chechen war has taken has pushed these tendencies to a level that could prove very damaging both to Russian democracy and its social and. political stability." (italics added) 21. This theme is addressed throughout in Lynch, How Russia is Not Ruled. "Basics of Muslim Culture," to be taught by Muslim clerics in the North Caucasus region. The reasoning seems to be to undermine critics of the "Basics of Orthodox Culture" courses, and to counterbalance the claims of Chechen separatists and other radical Muslims against the Orthodox Church.24 In short, the disposition of the Russian Orthodox Church to the issue of religion in the public schools is rather complex, but in the final analysis exemplifies its preferred position of ecumenical hegemonism. In so doing, the church has had the general effect of buttressing the Putin regime's increasingly "managed" pluralism, at least in the realm of church-state relations. In the realm of Orthodox-Muslim relations, however, such an approach may be useful and helpful from the perspective of the church and of the Kremlin, but may not ameliorate the growing tensions and problems. We tum now to those.
The threat of politicized Islam in the former USSR-tumed-Russian Federation turned out to be a particularly vexing problem for both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Putin administration, causing the church's ecumenism to be severely tested and causing tlie Putin adminstration's pluralism to becoming increasingly "managed." Anna Matveeva offered the following in 1999:
Looking back upon the conflicts in the 20th century in Eurasia, one might conclude that tliey were predominantly of an ethnic nature. Although Islam as a faith and a cultunil force has had a continual influence on Muslim parts of the USSR, its pollticiU role was virtually non-existent until the 1990s. Its revival, however, since the foundation of the Islamic Renaissance Party in 1990, was rapid, and its desire to influence political developments was apparent from the start."
A particularly sharp inclination toward a politicization of Islam has resulted from the Chechen war (cf tlie Radio Free Furope/Radio Liberty "factbox" noted above course exist as multiple ethnic groups, but share an Islamic identity whose political significance, it seems, is becoming increasingly evident. 26 Sociological evidence indicated that anti-Is/amic sentiments were not particularly widespread in the Russian Federation up to the time of the Putin regime, and this despite the Chechen conflict of the 1990s, the USSR's involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and the highly selective but substantial engagement of Russia wdth the Bush administration's U.S.-led "war on terrorism." In fact, the research by Dmitrii Furman and Kimmo Kaariainen indicated that over 60 percent of the Russian population expressed a "good" or "very good" assessment of Islam, despite an "Orthodox consensus" of values and identity across nationality groups and across religious orientations (Baptists, Lutherans, Buddhists, etc.)." For the most part, other religious orientations tend to be either positively assessed, or are regarded on balance rather neutrally, as Table 2 indicates below. These data suggest that an attitudinal basis for peaceful coexistence within Russia certainly exists in the realm of religious tolerance and acceptance. The fact that some religious groups (such as Baptists or Jehovali's Witnesses) tend to be viewed rather negatively does not necessarily signify a culture of intolerance or even disrespect of fellow citizens' religious orientation, but suggests the possibility of tension. In this respect, the prospect of deepening xenophobia, alluded to in the opening of this essay, is particularly ominous.28 In any case however, Russia nas a wide array of religious associations among scores of religious denominations, numbering well over 21,000; among tliese, inter-confessional conflict has hitherto been rather minimal. However, as the research and observations of Lawrence Uzzeli demonstrate, the Russian state under Vladimir Putin has not always been so tolerant.29 Furtlier, the relative strength of various groups-including first and foremost the Russian Orthodox Church-varies substantially across the 89 regions of Russia. Christopher Marsh and Paul Froese have observed and demonstrated a highly significant pattem:
where the Orthodox Church is strong and active, local governments place severe restrictions on minority religions. As argued by Fagan and by Homer and Uzzeli, the drive for restrictive religious policies emanates from the Orthodox Church itself, which puts pressure on state and regional leaders to pursue policies that either restrict the activity of other religious groups or provide the Orthodox Church with special privileges.™ This tendency to strongly favor the Orthodox Churches at the expense of others has been an ongoing complaint of Roman Catliolic officials and believers, who are said to number from 300,000 to over 28 But the Russian Orthodox Church must share Russia, so to speak, with a multitude of other communal groups, among which Islamic believers are the most significant, for numerous reasons. The general consensus is that Muslims number anywhere from 10 to 30 million, although various factors may be cited to account for this wide variation in estimate.33 Hunter considers that "a realistic range for Russia's Muslims is between 16 million and 20 million, with the latter closer to the mark."34 in any case, even though a clear minority in Russia, the proportion of Muslims is sufficiently large that their presence and disposition will be a major factor in the governance of Russia. This is especially so given the context of internationally-connected contemporary Islamist movements.
Further, it is clear that serious, complex lines of division exist among Muslims in the Russian Federation, with much of the animating energy beneath these divisions deriving from the question of how to deal with Moscow. The necessity of dealing with Moscow makes their connection with the Russian Orthodox Church more or less inevitable. Islam remains an important factor in Russia's political life, and there are enough reasons to worry. Religious radicals appeal to Islam; internal conflicts remain unresolved; foreigners continue to interfere across the borders; and that the ruling establishment is incapable (or unwilling) to understand Islam's impact on Russia's internal affairs. All these factors cause instability in tlie south of the Russian Federation. This instability, in tum, negatively affects the situation in the whole country. 36
Regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees witli the above sentiments, it appears difficult if not impossible to challenge tlie analysis offered by Radio Free Europe /Radio Liberty tliat most of the terrorist activity in Russia since the breakup of the USSR has been tied to the conflict in Chechnya. 37 Since the epicenter of the Russian- Muslim divide is increasingly coming to focus on Chechnya and the southern flank of Russia more generally, we tum now to that theme.
As noted above, the Putin regime's drive to centralize power and authority has been pursued with a shrewd relentlessness but has complicated the matter of relations among communal groups, albeit probably unintentionally. As such, it Has direct and significant consequences for the realm of church-state relations. Major indicators include the rise of Unified Russia to a position of dominance, the creation of the Public Chamber, with all evidence that it will be controlled by the presidential administration; persisting constriction of the media; and others. 38 The role of the Russian Orthodox Church in this centralization drive has been either one of positive cooperation or muted disengagement.^^ Particularly with respect to the Chechen conflict, there nas been little except general and rather politically antiseptic calls for peace and national unity.
By late 2005, it had become increasingly clear that the problem of intensified centralization of power by the Kremlin would hardly answer Russia's growing problem with terrorism. As noted above, a rising number of observers and commentators are concluding that it represents rather a compounding factor. Concerning the outbreak of violence in Kabardino-Balkaria in October, Masha Lipman suggested that the Moscow theater seizure of October 2002, in which 120 hostages died was followed by a quickening succession leading to the even worse schoolhouse tragedy in Beslan, North Ossetia, in September 2004. The terrorism problem was thus:
no longer confined to Chechnya; it had spread all over the north Caucasus and was making plain the need for a major rethinking of policy. . . .
When Putin took over as Russia's president, Kabardino-Balkaria was quiet. But Putin's use of brutal force in Chechnya has backfired, producing growing numbers of revenge-seekers. Further centralization of power has led to deeper problems of the kind inherent in a heavily bureaucratic system: poor performance, lack of accountability, failure to coordinate efforts because each official seeks first and foremost to avoid responsibility at any cost. A local leader with an independent source of authority is regarded with suspicion-loyalty to the Kremlin is valuecT above all. This breeds incompetence and powerlessness among local ofTicials.^o Thus, far from contributing to the unity and stability ofthe country, the policies resulting from the general centralization orientation of tlie Putin regime have an arguably fracturing effect. They are doing, so directly in the critically important southwestern flank or Russia, and to some degree elsewhere, ir only indirecdy. From this perspective, it hardly makes sense to continue speaking of Russia as moving positively in the direction of a monocultural political orientation, despite tlie intentions or preferences of the national leadership. But now do popular attitudes fit into this picture?
According to data from the Levada Center (September 2005), most citizens are not particularly supportive of President Putin's policies regarding Chechnya, even thougli they are broadly and consistently supportive of him as president. To resolve the Chechen conflict, 68 percent prefer to enter into negotiations, 20 percent favor continuing military operations, and 12 percent "don't know" (Table 3 ). These data have been rather consistent for the past several years, continuing even as general popular support for Putin remains quite high, at generally over 70 percent ofthe bli^i The Russian leadership's willingness and ability to resist this trend and protect the rights of Muslim ethnic minorities and to guarantee the free expression of Islamic religious and cuItunJ practices-while suppressing the extremist elements-will be crucial determinants of how the Russian political system evolves.*"
As noted above, terrorism steadily increased in Russia since the onset of the first Chechen war in 1994, into the second Putin term of office; more recently, evidence began to mount that tolerance and mutual civility are suffering setbacks,^6 Mounting evidence also illustrates that repression and brutality of Moscow's policies are the catalyst for the spreading resistance, but underlying socio-economic conditions of poverty and unemployment iJso create fertile soil for political radicalism. The Putin administration tends to point to this factor as the primary cause. Wliile such claims should be viewed with skepticism, the self-serving nature of this explanation does not negate its partial validity. Both sets of factors-the Kremlin's policies and practices and the general socioeconomic conditions-contribute to the overall impasse:
The socioeconomic situation, the influence of radiciJ Islamic organisations from abroad and the second Russian invasion in 1999 consequently all helped the growth of fundamentalism in Chechnya. These factors contributed to the fact that the dynamic that was started because of the first Russian invasion in 1994 ended up in a call for 'jihad' against Russia. . . . the Russian invasion is certainly not the only reason for the consequent radicalisation and politicisation of Islam in Chechnya, but it definitely lies at the roots of it. Although the dynamics that developed on the Chechen side because of the war definitely had specific characteristics, Sociologist Igor Yakovenko recently considered the range of possible scenarios concerning the unity anti itientity of Russia, up to and including the viability of its current territorial integrity. While recognizing the tleep, nagging, anti tlifferentiatetl problems of certain regions, he nonetheless concludes:
Russia is entering an epoch of national existence, A new European nation is being formed inside it, which the authorities designate as Rossiyane (Russian people) although this has not yet become a customary name for the Russian people. History alone will tell where the stable frontiers will lie for this new whole which is coming into being before our eyes,'" Perhaps this is so, but even if true, does not negate the problematical character of the religious element of Russian itientity. In October 2005, the federal Ministry of Regional Development issued a draft Concept Paper on Russian nationalities issues, putting forth sometliing of a reuewed version of the Soviet-era notion of a "new historical community of peoples." This was evidently prompted by presidential advisor Vladislav Surkov's deepening concern with national unity and territorial integrity. The tone of the document and the ensuing commentary in Russian and Western media suggested the Putin administration's keen interest in pursuing a sense of united nationhood for Russia, perhaps akin to Ataturk's concept of "populism," (halkcilik) to form the basis of the sense of identity for the Turldsh Republic in the 1920s, after the collapse of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. Such an approach is, of course, higlily problematic for Russia, especially given Russia's self-acknowledged multi-nationality. (The more or less official view of tlie Turkish government is that there is "one Turldsh nation," without national minorities per se; the Russian Federation is self-professedly multi-national.) But such an approach might be very amenable to the Russian Orthodox Church's preferred role as ecumenical hegemon over Russian culture, and uius over Russian society.so Nevertheless, according to Kommersant, "The main linchpin of the [Concept Paper] is the idea of "the formation of a single multinational society" with "the consolidating role of tlie Russian people," that is, in practice, the latest "new historical community," that, according to the 1977 Constitution of the USSR, was the Soviet people."61 Paul Goble offered that the Concept Paper should not be taken as definitive, but rather as symptomatic of the open nature of the question of President Putin's nationality poHcy (such as it is).52 Perhaps mis is so, but the fact that such a "concept paper" had emerged indicates some measure of official concern with tnis aspect of national unity.
But the likelihood of an actual breakup of the Russian Federation seems particularly remote, as does tne prospect of an ongoing civil war, despite warnings by Ravil Caynutin, chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia, that "witliout peace and accord between nationalities, our country faces inevitable disintegration."53 While tliis statement seems hyperbolic, the fact remains that almost immediately after the collapse of the IJSSR, serious questions arose about the ethno-territorial viability of the Russian state. However, by late 2006, unless the Putin administration effected an abrupt about-face and opened the door for a negotiated political settlement of the Chechen conflict (which well over 60 percent of Russians recently favored, as noted above),54 the formal territorial integrity of the Russian Federation seems quite solid. Nevertheless, the question of the geographical locus of Rossiia still commands an array of varying opinions: the final sentence of O'Loughlin and Talbot's recent study of Russian popular views of this matter is quite revealing: "[T]he question of where Russia's borders lie persists, complicated by the large Russian diasporas in neighboring states and the long history of expansion and contact with Slavic and Islamic populations,"ss The Russian Orthodox Church's faithful reflection of the state's answer to this question may be prudentially useful to both church and state, but may do little in and of itself to resolve the deeper issues of communal conflict that have become all too evident during the Putin years. In this respect, Russia's increasingly authoritarian "managed pluralism" of society by the Kremlin, replete with an evolving "ecumenical hegemonism" by the Russian Orthodox Church in the realm of interaction among religious communities and the larger society governed by that state, may be spawning more and greater problems that it can resolve.
CONCLUSION
Russia under Putin has been presented in both scholarly and popular Western discourse as having moved into an increasingly authoritarian, state-centric political system, particularly since tne Beslan tragedy of September 2004, The Kremlin has generally responded by refuting this characterization as unfair, given the proolems Russia faces, certainly including the imperative of maintaining the country's territorial integrity in the face of escalating terrorism and the broadening of separatist movements,56 In any case, the Russian Orthodox Church will inevitably continue to be a significant actor in defining Russian society and thus in shaping the character of the political regime, for good or for ill, despite the low levels of public religiosity displayed by Russians, The church could conceivably become an important force in restraining the state from descending into a full-scale reversion to a form of governance ° simply not accountable to the public, nor to any social group, movement, or force, Civen the historical role of the Russian Orthodox Church in actually carrying out such a function, however, hopes should not be too high. Perhaps to do so would expect too much. But in any case, to the extent that Orthodoxy is used as a buttressing device to shore up support for the regime's attempts to bring about an Orthodox-orientea "monocultural" Russia, it risks losing credibility as the knot of violence and repression, particularly on the southern flank of Russia, grows increasingly tight.
